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                 sexual orientation amendments, 
               and all others similarly situated. 
                                 
  (*Parties substituted pursuant to Fed R. App. P. 43(c)(1).) 
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                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                       
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
         The Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox 
Presbyterian Church, Calvary Orthodox Presbyterian Church of 
Wildwood, and the Reverend David B. Cummings filed suit 
challenging the sexual orientation provisions of the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination.  The district court dismissed their 
facial First Amendment challenge and abstained from deciding 
their "as applied" challenge.  For reasons somewhat different 
from those given by the district court, we will affirm. 
 
                                I. 
         In 1992, the New Jersey Legislature added "affectional 
and sexual orientation" to the list of protected classes in its 
Law Against Discrimination.  The amendments made it illegal to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in the employment 
relationship, in public accommodations, and in business dealings. 
         To appellants, the Law Against Discrimination 
amendments represented New Jersey's repudiation of 5,000 years of 
Judeo-Christian morality.  They believed that the Law Against 
Discrimination's provisions forbidding aiding and abetting 
discrimination trammeled their rights to follow the tenets of 
their religion in their business dealings and to preach against 
immorality in general and homosexuality in particular.  
Accordingly, they filed this § 1983 action alleging that the 1992 
amendments violated the First Amendment right of free speech, 
alleging that the amended Law Against Discrimination is both 
unconstitutionally overbroad and a content-based restriction on 
speech. 
         The facts underlying this dispute have been set forth 
several times by now.  See Presbytery v. Florio, 60 F.E.P. Cases 
(BNA) 805, 1992 WL 414680 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 983 F.2d 1052 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (Presbytery I); Presbytery v. Florio, 830 F. Supp. 241 
(D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part, 40 F.3d 1454 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(Presbytery II); Presbytery v. Florio, 902 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 
1995) (Presbytery III).  Appellants assert that the theological 
doctrine of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and its members is 
based strictly upon Biblical teachings.  As such, appellants 
assert that this doctrine requires them to condemn homosexuality, 
both publicly and in their private lives and business dealings by 
speaking out against it and by avoiding those who engage in it.  
The sincerity with which these beliefs are held is not disputed. 
         The Law Against Discrimination amendments generally 
exempt religious organizations from their provisions regarding 
hiring.  See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a). Moreover, the director of the 
New Jersey Division on Civil Rights has stipulated that places of 
worship are not public accommodations within the meaning of the 
Law Against Discrimination and that Reverend Cummings would 
therefore not be subject to liability for discriminatory acts he 
might commit in his capacity as a pastor.  Nevertheless, Cummings  
points to several provisions of the Law Against Discrimination 
which he believes could subject him and other religionists to 
suit in their capacities as private citizens: (1) N.J.S.A. § 
10:5-12(e), which bans aiding and abetting, inciting, compelling 
or coercing another to perform a discriminatory act; (2) N.J.S.A. 
§ 10:5-12(n), which generally forbids aiding and abetting a 
boycott; (3) N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(j), which requires the posting of 
notices of nondiscrimination; and, (4) to the extent incorporated 
by the two aiding and abetting provisions, § 10:5-12(c) 
(proscribing employer from printing or circulating discriminatory 
statements), § 10:5-12(f) (in public accommodations), § 10:5- 
12(l) (prohibiting refusal to do business); § 10:5-12(h) 
(prohibiting requirement of boycott as condition of doing 
business).  For example, appellants assert that if a person, 
following the tenets of his or her religion, circulated tracts 
condemning homosexuality and exhorting employers to discharge 
such persons, and if an employer read one of those tracts and 
acted upon it, the person who caused the tract to be printed 
could be held liable as an aider and abettor. 
         The district court first held that, while the 
challenges to the aiding and abetting prohibitions were ripe for 
review, the notice posting challenge was not.  902 F. Supp. at 
503-09.  Then, after determining that Reverend Cummings had both 
individual and third party standing, it proceeded to consider 
whether it should abstain from reaching the merits under the 
Pullman abstention doctrine.  The court held that, to the extent 
appellants were asserting a valid facial challenge to the Law 
Against Discrimination, abstention would be improper, but it 
concluded ultimately that the Law Against Discrimination was not 
facially unconstitutional.  Id. at 516-23.  It then abstained as 
to the "as applied" challenge, but retained jurisdiction.  Id. at 
523. 
                               II. 
         The district court first considered whether appellants' 
facial challenge to the amended Law Against Discrimination was 
meritorious.  It viewed this challenge as having two principal 
arguments: first, that the statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad; and second, that it is an unconstitutional content- 
based, viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on speech.  902 F. 
Supp. at 516.  It rejected the facial challenge because it 
believed that the Law Against Discrimination provisions at issue 
were capable of some constitutional application and because 
appellants had not demonstrated that the challenged provisions 
are overbroad.  Id. at 516-17.  The district court rejected the 
viewpoint discrimination challenge under the "secondary effects" 
doctrine set forth in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), opining that, because the Law Against 
Discrimination provisions were not targeted at speech condemning 
homosexuality but rather the effects of discriminatory conduct, 
they passed constitutional muster because they were rational and 
served the substantial government interest of ending 
discrimination.  Id. at 517-22. 
 
                                A. 
     For the most part, we agree with the district court's 
analysis of appellants' facial challenge.  In City Council of the 
City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 
S.Ct. 2118 (1984), the Supreme Court discussed facial invalidity 
under the First Amendment.  First, it noted that a statute may be 
declared facially invalid if it is "apparent that any attempt to 
enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the 
suppression of ideas."  Id. at 797, 104 S. Ct. at 2124 (emphasis 
added).  That is plainly not the case here.  As the district 
court aptly noted under the aid and abet provision,  
     the State could permissibly prohibit, for example, an 
     individual from offering a $500 reward to employers for 
     each time that they refuse to hire a gay or lesbian job 
     applicant because of the applicant's sexual 
     orientation.  Such a reward scheme would have little to 
     do with the expression of ideas and could legitimately 
     be regulated by the state[.] 
 
902 F. Supp. at 517.  Likewise, a person who threatened a 
business if it refused to fire its gay employees could certainly 
be held liable as a "coercer" under the Law Against 
Discrimination without offending the Speech Clause. 
     Appellants argue that this statute is indeed incapable of 
any constitutional application, relying on Dambrot v. Central 
Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995), and Doe v. University 
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).  Those cases, 
however, are inapposite.  Both involved university "hate speech 
codes" that explicitly purported to regulate speech and other 
protected First Amendment activity.  Because protected activity 
was the target of these regulations, they had no constitutional 
application and were thus facially invalid. 
     Nor are we persuaded that City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 107 S. Ct. 2502 (1987), militates towards finding the Law 
Against Discrimination facially unconstitutional.  In that case, 
a municipal ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to 
assault, strike, or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or 
interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty," and the 
Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional on its face.  
Id. at 467, 107 S. Ct. at 2512.  Appellants point to the 
unprotected conduct proscribed in that statute and argue that the 
fact that unprotected conduct is likewise regulated by the Law 
Against Discrimination cannot therefore foreclose a facial 
challenge to that statute.  A careful reading of Hill, however, 
discloses that all of the prohibited conduct in that ordinance 
was preempted by the state criminal code, leaving only the speech 
restrictions intact as a matter of state law.  That being the 
case, there were no constitutional applications of the ordinance 
and the Supreme Court invalidated it on facial grounds.  Here, 
the "conduct" restrictions are an integral part of New Jersey law 
and have been enforced for most of the last half-century.  
Accordingly, Hill is not dispositive. 
     Second, the Vincent court discussed overbreadth, the other 
way in which a statute might be found facially invalid: 
     [T]he very existence of some broadly written statutes 
     may have such a deterrent effect on free expression 
     that they should be subject to challenge even by a 
     party whose own conduct may be unprotected.  The Court 
     has repeatedly held that such a statute may be 
     challenged on its face even though a more narrowly 
     drawn statute would be valid as applied to the party in 
     the case before it.  This exception from the general 
     rule is predicated on a judicial prediction or 
     assumption that the statute's very existence may cause 
     others not before the court to refrain from 
     constitutionally protected speech or expression. 
 
Id. at 798-99, 104 S. Ct. at 2125 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the overbreadth doctrine permits 
a litigant whose own activities are unprotected to challenge the 
statute by claiming that is infringes the rights of others not 
before the court.  In this case, however, appellants make no 
argument that, while their own activities may be unprotected, the 
protected activities of third parties not before the court might 
be drawn within the ambit of the Law Against Discrimination.  
Rather, it appears that appellants' activities are no different 
from those of any other person who might assert a First Amendment 
challenge to the statute.  That is fatal to appellants' claim 
that the Law Against Discrimination is unconstitutionally 
overbroad.  Id. at 801-02, 104 S. Ct. at 2127 (overbreadth 
challenge inappropriate where it appeared that, if ordinance 
could be validly applied to plaintiffs, it could be validly 
applied to anybody).  Accordingly, we agree with the district 
court that appellants have not presented a valid facial challenge 
to the Law Against Discrimination. 
                                B. 
     That leaves appellants with an "as applied" challenge to the 
Law Against Discrimination, specifically appellants' argument 
that the Law Against Discrimination is an impermissible content- 
based restriction on speech.  The district court apparently 
believed that this argument was part of appellants' facial 
challenge to the statute, since it engaged in a detailed legal 
analysis of the issue in that section of its opinion.  See 902 F. 
Supp. at 517-22. 
     That analysis, however, was unnecessary, and consequently we 
express no view as to its correctness.  Once the district court 
determined that the challenged Law Against Discrimination 
provisions were capable of some constitutional application and 
that they are not properly the subject of an overbreadth 
challenge, there was no remaining issue of facial invalidity to 
be decided.  Rather, whether the Law Against Discrimination was 
an unconstitutional content-based restraint on speech could only 
be determined within the context of its application to 
appellants.  Thus, if the district court correctly abstained from 
deciding appellants' as applied challenge, its discussion of 
viewpoint discrimination and the secondary effects doctrine was 
unnecessary. 
                                C. 
     We believe that the district court correctly applied 
Pullmanabstention.  Pullman abstention may be employed "when a federal 
court is presented with both a federal constitutional issue and 
an unsettled issue of state law whose resolution might narrow or 
eliminate the federal constitutional question, . . .  [thus] 
avoid[ing] 'needless friction with state policies.'"  Chez Sez 
III Corp. v. Township of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S. Ct. 
643, 645 (1941)).  As a matter of law, Pullman abstention 
requires the following special circumstances: (1) uncertain 
issues of state law underlying the federal constitutional claim; 
(2) state law issues subject to state court interpretation that 
could obviate the need to adjudicate or substantially narrow the 
scope of the federal constitutional claim; and (3) an erroneous 
construction of state law by the federal court would disrupt 
important state policies.  Chez Sez, 945 F.2d at 631; accordHughes v. 
Lipscher, 906 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1990).  If these 
special circumstances are all present, the court should make a 
"discretionary determination" as to whether abstention is 
appropriate under the circumstances, based on certain "equitable 
considerations."  Chez Sez, 945 F.2d at 631.  We find, as did the 
district court, that all three requirements are met here and that 
abstention is appropriate under these circumstances. 
     First, it is clear that the state law issues are uncertain.  
Although there is some evidence that New Jersey would interpret 
this language in the Law Against Discrimination in the same 
manner as it does in the criminal law context, see Baliko v. 
Stecker, 645 A.2d 1218, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted the language "aid, abet, 
incite, compel or coerce" only once in the context of a First 
Amendment challenge, and that case involved commercial speech.  
See Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649 (N.J. 1973), in 
which the supreme court held that providing sex-segregated 
classified advertising columns aided employers' acts of sex 
discrimination.  In sum, we simply do not know how the courts of 
New Jersey would interpret the "aid and abet" language. 
     Second, it is quite possible that the New Jersey courts 
would construe the challenged language so as to avoid reaching 
the type of conduct in which Reverend Cummings and others 
similarly situated engage.  Indeed, the state agency responsible 
for the statute's enforcement has stipulated that the Law Against 
Discrimination should not be construed to reach speech protected 
under the First Amendment.  Should the New Jersey courts agree 
(and it indeed appears that the agency's views would be entitled 
to considerable weight, see Blair, 308 A.2d at 654), it is likely 
that appellants' First Amendment claim would be substantially 
narrowed, if not eliminated entirely. 
     Third, the potential for disruption of important state 
policies is manifest.  For many decades, the Law Against 
Discrimination has been a powerful tool in New Jersey's war 
against discrimination.  Were we to erroneously construe it to 
reach appellants' conduct and then find it violative of the First 
Amendment, we could eviscerate the entire aiding and abetting 
prohibitions, not only for sexual orientation, but for race, 
gender and creed as well.  See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a). 
     Thus, we conclude that the district court had the power to 
abstain under the Pullman doctrine.  Turning to the equitable 
factors, we also conclude that its application of Pullmanabstention was a 
proper exercise of its discretion.  Although 
abstention should generally not be applied to facial challenges, 
there is no such restriction with respect to an "as applied" 
challenge because there is less of a concern that protected 
activity will be inhibited if the court abstains from deciding 
the First Amendment issues.  Chez Sez, 945 F.2d at 633-34.   
     Appellants point to the additional delay which they will 
suffer if they are forced to adjudicate their state law issues in 
the New Jersey courts, relying on Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 
944 F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 1991), and Biegenwald v. Fauver, 882 
F.2d 748, 750-51 (3rd Cir. 1989).  Stretton, however, involved an 
imminent judicial election and the plaintiff in Biegenwald was 
under sentence of death.  In both cases, abstention threatened 
any possibility of relief.  The situation here is simply not that 
extreme. 
     Moreover, New Jersey law provides for declaratory relief 
when a person is unsure of the application of a statute.  SeeN.J.S.A. § 
2A:15-53.  Thus, appellants had and continue to have 
the statutory opportunity to obtain a definitive construction of 
the Law Against Discrimination provisions at issue from the New 
Jersey courts.  Thus, any delay is at least partly of appellants' 
own making, as they plainly possessed the right to seek a 
declaratory judgment in state court from the outset of this 
litigation and should have realized that federal court abstention 
was at least a possibility. 
                               III. 
     Because appellants have not presented a valid facial 
challenge to the Law Against Discrimination and because the 
district court abstained properly from their "as applied" 
challenge, we will affirm. 
   
